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1.   Introduction 
Understanding how partisan campaign activity affects vote choice and voter 
turnout is a central issue in both political science and economics.  If campaign activity 
has an independent effect on election outcomes, then the policy preferences of election-
oriented politicians may not perfectly reflect those of the median voter (Baron 1989, 
Grossman and Helpman 1994).  Estimates of the effect of campaign activity are also 
essential to predicting the impact of reforms to the political process such as restrictions 
on campaign spending.   
Yet, despite an extensive empirical literature devoted to this topic, the magnitude 
of the impact of campaign activity on voters is still unresolved.  For several reasons 
simple correlations between campaign activity and vote share do not represent a causal 
effect.  Campaign activity and vote share are both outcomes of a complex process that 
depends on many aspects of candidates and elections that are difficult to measure.  For 
example, if more able candidates attract both more campaign resources and more votes, 
and candidate ability is not fully observable, then regression estimates of the effect of 
campaign spending on vote share will inevitably reflect some combination of the true 
causal effect and unobserved heterogeneity.   
In this paper, we use a regression discontinuity (RD) approach to identify the 
effects on campaign activity on turnout and vote share.  Although previous papers have 
sought to address the endogeneity of campaign activity, none has used RD to do so.  
During the contest for Kansas attorney general in 2006, an organization sent out 6 pieces 
of mail criticizing the Republican incumbent’s conduct in office. We obtained a complete 
record of which households received the mailings as well as the algorithm used to select  
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the households for inclusion in the universe of households that received the mail.  We 
also obtained precinct-level candidate vote totals, the lowest level of aggregation at 
which candidate choice is observed, and individual level voter turnout records.   We 
exploit our knowledge of the selection rule to isolate a discontinuity in the targeting 
algorithm which resulted in substantially different amounts of mail in otherwise similar 
precincts.  Our identification strategy compares precinct-level vote shares and individual 
turnout decisions in similar precincts that received substantially different amounts of mail 
as result of this discontinuity.  We find that the 6 piece mail campaign had no effect on 
turnout but caused a sizable increase in the vote share of the Democratic challenger.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews the previous 
literature on the topic.  Sections 3 and 4 present the study design and data respectively.  
Section 5 describes our econometric model and presents results.  Section 6 provides 
additional analysis to flesh out the mechanism behind our results in Section 5.  Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2.  Previous Literature 
Jacobson (1985) was the first to use statistical methods to estimate the effect of 
campaign spending.  Using the then-newly-available FEC data on candidate expenditures 
in US House and Senate races, he finds large positive correlations between challenger 
spending and challenger vote share, but little relation between incumbent spending and 
incumbent vote share. 
This provocative finding spurred researchers in political science and economics to 
search for ways to deal with the problem of the endogeneity of campaign activity.  One  
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approach seeks to identify the effect of campaign spending from races in which the same 
candidates face each other on repeated occasions (Levitt 1994).  Although fixed-effects 
models like this hold constant the characteristics of candidates and areas, they remain 
vulnerable to bias if spending adjusts to changes in political conditions.  Another 
approach seeks to use instrumental variables that induce variation in spending but are 
uncorrelated with the characteristics of candidates and elections (Green and Krasno 1988, 
Gerber 1998, Erikson and Palfrey 2000).  Complementing these studies on the effects of 
campaign spending are several recent papers employing natural experiments to measure 
the effects of mass media communication on voter turnout and candidate choice (e.g. 
Gentzkow (2006), George and Waldfogel (2007), DellaVingna and Kaplan (2007)). 
However, each of these studies is vulnerable on the familiar grounds that the exclusion 
restrictions or modeling details justifying the instrumental variables approach are not 
valid. 
A third approach uses randomized field experiments to assess how voters respond 
to campaign activity.  Most of this work has focused on estimating the effects on turnout 
(Gerber and Green 2000; Green and Gerber 2008).  According to meta-analysis of dozens 
of studies of each of the alternative methods of voter mobilization, door-to-door 
canvassing prior to the election often has a large effect on voter turnout, raising turnout 
by approximately eight percentage points in a typical election, while phone calls and 
mailings have more modest effects. A live phone call from a commercial firm raises 
turnout around 0.5 percentage points, a call from a volunteer, two and a half percentage 
points, and several pieces of campaign mail boosts turnout by approximately one 
percentage point (Green and Gerber 2008).   
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Substantially fewer field experiments have been employed to study the effects of 
campaign activity on vote share.  Although randomized experiments are free from the 
biases inherent in the use of observational data, they have other limitations when applied 
to the study of voter choice.  First, the secret ballot means that individual voters' 
candidate choices, unlike their turnout, are not a matter of public record.  One response to 
this is to randomize mailings at the household-level and measure the effect on vote share 
using post election surveys. Gerber (2004) uses this method to study the effect of 
campaign activity in a collection of local elections from 1999 and 2000 and finds that 
incumbent spending was ineffective while challenger spending was effective.  These and 
similar studies tend to be small due to the cost of administering post-election surveys and 
vulnerable to bias due to high rates of survey non-response.
1 An alternative response is to 
randomize campaign activity at the precinct level. Gerber (2004) uses this approach to 
study the effects of an incumbent’s direct mail campaign in a 2002 US House primary 
and general election, and finds large effects on vote share in the primary and no effects in 
the general election. While potentially quite promising due to the availability of vote 
share at the precinct level, the application of this method is limited by the fact that few 
campaigns, particularly those in competitive electoral environments, are willing to 
remove a substantial number of precincts from the campaign’s communications efforts.   
  In this paper, we use regression discontinuity (RD) methods to avoid some of 
these limitations.  While we are not the first to apply RD to politics (see, among others,  
Lee 2001, Petterson-Lidbom 2006, Ferraz and Finan 2008), we are the first to use RD to 
assess the effect of campaign activity on voter choice.  Although field experiments 
                                                 
1 There are additional concerns that the treatment may affect survey responses, but not vote-choice, or vice-
versa.  
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require fewer identifying assumptions, RD enjoys several potential advantages in this 
context.  First, RD is less obtrusive. Campaigns may be reluctant to alter their campaign 
plans to produce control groups, while RD merely requires the campaign to keep track of 
the rules (and cutoffs) used to determine the campaign targets. This suggests that RD 
might be applied to a larger and potentially more representative sample of campaigns. 
Second, RD can be applied historically if campaign records can be obtained.  Many 
campaigns are currently being conducted and treatment assignment rules are held secret. 
If the selection rules for the mailings and other campaign activity are preserved, these 
campaigns can be a source of valuable information about the effects of campaign activity 
once there is no longer a need to maintain secrecy. This holds for all contests, including 
competitive races, where political actors might be especially resistant to setting aside 
control groups.   
 
3. Study Design 
Our study focuses on the effects of a 6 piece direct mail campaign in the highly 
competitive Kansas state attorney general race in the 2006 midterm election.  This 
election featured a Republican incumbent against a Democratic challenger.  The mail, 
which was sponsored by the advocacy group Kansans for Consumer Privacy Protection, 
informed constituents about the group’s concerns regarding the incumbent’s conduct in 
office, suggesting that the incumbent was violating citizens’ privacy by “snooping” 
around peoples’ medical records rather than fighting crime. The mailings, which featured 
pictures of a variety of dogs to illustrate the snooping theme, are included in the 
appendix. The mailings were sent every two or three days in the final two weeks before  
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the election to a selected set of households with at least one registered voter in a subset of 
Congressional districts.  Households received either one set of mailings or no mailings, 
regardless of how many registered voters resided there.  We consider a voter to have 
received mail if anyone in his or her household received mail.   
The vendor sent mail to a voter according to a function of three groups of 
variables:  the background characteristics of each of the registered voters in the 
household, including party registration, gender, voting history, time since registration, 
and other demographic characteristics; responses to a phone survey designed to exclude 
from the mailing registered voters who stated that they were committed to voting for a 
specific candidate; and the voter's location in a census block in which more than 5.08131 
percent of the households had incomes greater than $150,000.   We observe the variables 
in the first and third group, but do not observe responses to the phone survey. 
Simple least-squares estimates of the Democratic challenger's vote share on the 
proportion of registered voters in a precinct receiving mail are likely to be inconsistent.  
The probability of receiving mail is positively correlated with voters' background 
characteristics, phone survey responses, and census-block income levels, all of which 
might also be correlated with voting behavior.  However, the pseudo-random experiment 
created by the discontinuity in the targeting rule allows us to estimate the causal effect of 
mail by comparing precincts that contain census blocks with incomes just above the 
income threshold with those precincts that contain census blocks just below the income 
threshold.  
We develop an instrumental variable (IV) specification based on a fuzzy 
regression discontinuity design (Hahn, Todd, and Vand der Klaauw, 2001) to identify the  
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causal effect of mail on election outcomes.  Because census block demographic 
discontinuities are common in political targeting formulas, we generate a specification 
that can be applied generally to problems of this type.  Although census block and 
precinct boundaries are drawn independently, the geographic clustering of mail in certain 
census blocks also resulted in the clustering of mail in certain precincts.  The share of 
voters in a precinct receiving mail thus varied depending on the weighted average of the 
census-block incomes for all census blocks contained in the precinct.  The fuzzy 
regression discontinuity design takes advantage of the fact that living in a precinct 
containing a census block above the income threshold increases the probability of 
receiving mail; however, unlike with a sharp discontinuity, it does not determine 
treatment status.  We use the fact that the vendor informed us whether they would have 
sent each voter mail, had the voter lived in a census block that met the income threshold.  
We refer to this variable as the mail eligibility of a voter.  The first stage of our IV 
regression estimates the effect on the share of voters in a precinct receiving mail of an 
increase in the share of voters residing in census blocks just above the income threshold, 
holding constant the share of voters in the precinct who are mail eligible.  The second 
stage regression then estimates the effect of this variation in the share of voters receiving 
mail on the vote share of the Democratic challenger.   
The exclusion restriction necessary to ensure the consistency of the IV estimate is 
that precincts containing census blocks with incomes just above the income threshold are 
similar to precincts containing census blocks just below the income threshold, but for 
their probability of receiving mail given the control variables in the second stage.  To  
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enhance the validity of this exclusion restriction, we restrict our analysis to those 
precincts that contain census blocks in a small window around the income threshold.   
Because we are using a quasi-experiment rather than a randomized experiment, 
we can not be certain that the probability of receiving mail is orthogonal to unobservable 
determinants of vote share.  We therefore develop an estimation framework that attempts 
to isolate the effect of mail from any pre-treatment differences in those precincts 
containing census blocks just above versus just below the income threshold.  We use a 
difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) specification to allow for the possibility 
that unobserved determinants of support for the Democratic challenger were somehow 
correlated with the receipt of mail.   
To implement our DDD specification we first take the difference in the vote share 
of the 2006 Democratic attorney-general candidate in those precincts with voters in 
census blocks just above versus just below the income threshold.  We then compare this 
difference to the difference in the same precincts in the 2002 attorney-general race.  This 
is designed to capture pre-treatment differences in the support for Democratic attorney-
general candidates in precincts containing census blocks just above versus just below the 
income threshold.    We also estimate the same difference-in-difference for a “control” 
race that was not subject to the income threshold used in the attorney-general race.  This 
control difference-in-difference is design to capture changes in the general tendency to 
vote Democratic across time in precincts with voters just above and just below the 
income threshold.  We then take the difference in the difference-in-difference in the 
attorney-general and the “control” race to get our DDD estimate of the effect of mail. 
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4. Data 
  We use two sources of data.  We use precinct-level election returns from the state 
attorney general, gubernatorial, and secretary of state races from the 2006 election.  We 
also obtain precinct-level returns from the state attorney general, gubernatorial, and 
secretary of state races from the 2002 election to control for the pre-treatment political 
preferences of each precinct's registered voters.   
Second, we match to this file to precinct-level summaries of an individual-
registrant level voter file obtained directly from the mail vendor.  The voter file contains 
all of the variables used by the vendor to select households to receive mail and the 
turnout of each household's registered voters in the 2006 election.  As discussed above, 
the vendor sent mail according to the income of the voter's census block and the voter's 
mail eligibility.   
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for a selected set of these characteristics.  The 
Secretary of State’s office reports election results for 2,711 precincts in the targeted 
Congressional Districts.  After eliminating precincts because the precincts used in the 
vendor’s voter file did not match those used by the Secretary of State’s office, because 
precinct boundaries changed over time, or because individual vote history was 
unavailable, we are left with a final sample of 1731 precincts.
2 
Table 2 illustrates the identification strategy and our basic result.  The first row of 
the table reports vote shares from precincts that had at least 10 percent of voters that were 
                                                 
2 We exclude 293 precincts, covering 8.1 percent of registrants, because the precincts in the vendor’s file 
did not match those used by the Secretary of State’s office.  We exclude 383 more precincts, covering 25.8 
percent of registrants, because precinct boundaries change between 2002 and 2006.  We exclude an 
additional 109 precincts, covering 2.8 of registrants, because we don’t have either 2002 or 2006 vote 
history.  Finally in 265 precincts we need to consolidate two or more precincts into a single observation in 
order to match between the vendor’s file and the Secretary of State’s files.  These 265 precincts are 
collapsed down to 70 observations.  
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mail eligible and from census blocks with 5.08131-8.08131 percent of households 
earning more than $150,000.
3  In the 77 precincts that met these conditions, 16.8 percent 
of voters received mail.  The second row of the table reports vote shares for precincts that 
had at least 10 percent of voters that were mail eligible and from census blocks just below 
the income threshold -- that is, from census blocks with 2.08131-5.08131 percent of 
households earning more than $150,000.  In the 337 precincts that met these conditions, 
7.5 percent of voters received mail.   
Column (1) in Table 2 reports the vote shares in the 2006 attorney general 
election in precincts just above and just below the income threshold.  It shows that in the 
77 precincts just above the income threshold, the Democratic candidate received 55.0 
percent of the vote compared to 54.5 in 337 precincts just below the income threshold.  If 
we assume that there were no pre-treatment differences in precincts just above and just 
below the income threshold, we can estimate the percentage point change in the level of 
the Democratic attorney-general candidate's vote share caused by the receipt of mail, by 
taking the difference in the vote share received in precincts just above and just below the 
income threshold.  The single-difference estimate of the effect of mail is thus 
D = 55.0 – 54.5 = 0.5 percentage points (standard error 1.4). 
Of course, precincts are not randomly assigned to be just above or just below the 
income threshold; therefore there may be some pre-treatment differences in the likelihood 
of choosing the Democratic attorney-general candidate.
4  Column (2) shows the vote 
                                                 
3 In this section we will refer to these precincts as precincts just above or below the income threshold, even 
though technically the income threshold is a property of a census block, and not a precinct.  
4 Later in the paper we compare the party registration, mail eligibility, and the gender of registrants for the 
414 precincts that are used to construct Table 2. There are important differences in precincts above and 
below the income threshold; for example, precincts getting more mail had substantially more Republicans 
and fewer Democrats.    
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share of Democratic attorney-general candidate in 2002, when no mail was sent, for 
precincts above and below the income threshold.  We use the 2002 results to calculate a 
2002 analog to D, which captures the pre-treatment “placebo” effect of mail.   We find in 
2002 that the Democratic attorney-general candidate received 46.9 percent of the vote in 
precincts just above the income threshold, which is 1.6 percentage points less than the 
48.5 percent of the vote received in precincts just below the income threshold.  If we 
assume that these differences in the support for the Democratic attorney-general 
candidate in precincts above and below the income threshold are time invariant then DD, 
the difference-in-difference estimate of the causal effect of mail, is:     
DD = ((55.0 – 54.5) – (46.9 – 48.5)) =  
2.1 percentage points (standard error 1.3). 
The difference-in-difference estimate allows voter preferences for Democratic 
attorney-general candidates in the precincts just above and just below the income 
threshold to differ.  However, it assumes that any differences in preference for 
Democratic attorney general candidates in precincts just above and just below the income 
threshold are constant across time.  This assumption may be problematic if precincts just 
above the income threshold became more or less Democratic in general between 2002 
and 2006 than those just below the income threshold.  The remainder of Table 2 explores 
the possibility that precincts above and below the income threshold differed in their 
general tendency to vote Democratic across time.  In columns (3) and (4) we investigate 
how precincts just above and just below the income threshold differed in their voting 
patterns in the 2002 and 2006 gubernatorial race.    To do this, we calculate the 
difference-in-difference effect of mail in the gubernatorial race, which was not subject to  
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a mailing with an income discontinuity in either 2002 or 2006.  Under the assumption 
that the differential preference for Democratic candidates across time in precincts just 
above and just below the income threshold is constant across offices, the gubernatorial 
race provides a counterfactual of the change in Democratic attorney-general vote share in 
precincts just above and just below the income threshold absent any mail.  Contrary to 
what we would expect if precincts just above the income threshold became more 
Democratic between 2002 and 2006, we find that the trend in gubernatorial vote shares 
declined by -0.3 percentage points (standard error 0.9).   
The final row of the table presents the DDD effect of mail:  the difference in 
Democratic votes shares in precincts just above versus just below the income threshold, 
in the 2006 versus the 2002 elections, for the attorney general versus governor.  To 
estimate the difference-in-difference-in-difference effect of mail we subtract the placebo 
difference-in-difference effect we observe in the governor race from the difference-in-
difference effect we observe in the attorney-general race.  The DDD estimate of the effect 
of mail is thus:  
 DDD  = ((55.0 – 54.5) – (46.9 – 48.5)) – ((54.6 – 57.2) – (51.0 – 53.4))  
= 2.4 percentage points (standard error 1.1). 
This effect is quite substantial in political terms.  Given that the difference in the 
share of households receiving mail in the two sorts of precincts is 9.3 percentage points 
(= 0.168 - 0.075), this implies the average treatment-on-the-treated effect of mail was 
about 25.8 percentage points.   This suggests that a moderately intensive down ballot 
direct-mail effort can persuade enough voters to alter the result of a close election.  
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Table 3 suggests that the DDD estimate of the effect of mail from Table 2 is not 
an artifact of voter preferences for the particular “control” office we selected to construct 
the DDD.  This might occur, for example, if the relationship between income and 
preference for Democratic candidates were stronger in up-ballot races such as governor 
as compared to down-ballot elections like attorney-general or secretary of state.  In both 
the 2002 and 2006 elections, the vote shares for the Democratic secretary of state were 
smaller in the precincts just above versus just below the income threshold.  Moreover, 
there was greater relative support for the Democratic secretary of state candidate in 
“control” precincts than “treatment” precincts in 2006 than 2002.    This suggests using 
vote shares from the election for secretary of state, rather than vote shares from the 
election for governor, would not change our results.  We explore this hypothesis in 
greater detail in the econometric models that follow.    
 
5. Econometric Model and Results 
Model 
The results above suggest that receipt of mail may have had large effect on voting 
behavior in the 2006 Kansas attorney-general race.  In this section we develop an 
econometric model to formalize the assumptions necessary to identify this effect.  We 
model the share of votes received by the Democratic candidate in race r = (attorney 
general, governor) or (attorney general, secretary of state) and precinct p = (1, …, P) at 
year t = (2002, 2006), Srpt.  Vote share Srpt depends on (race × year)-specific constant 
terms
5; the share of voters in the precinct who received mail, mp; a vector function gp(Ω) 
                                                 
5 α0, β0, δ0, and φ0 are each five-element vectors: a constant term and dummy variables for the home county 
and home media markets of the Republican and Democratic candidates   We include fixed effects for the  
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of the characteristics Ω of voters and census blocks contained in a precinct
6; interactions 
between race, year and mp and gp(); and an error term εrpt:  
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For each of the Np voters in a precinct, the matrix Ω contains 5 variables:  whether the 
voter is mail eligible, registered Democratic, registered Republican, female, and the 
percentage of households in the voter's census block with incomes above $150,000.  The 
vector function gp(Ω) returns 14 variables defined at the precinct level:  the share of 
voters who are mail eligible, registered Democratic, registered Republican, and female, 
Xp; a cubic polynomial in the estimated proportion of residents in a precinct who have 












I , with Rpb the number of registered 
voters in precinct p who live in census block b; interaction terms between Xp and this 
cubic polynomial; and two additional variables g1p and g2p.  The variables g1p and g2p 
partition the precinct level variable mail eligible into sections defined by census-block 
income to capture nonlinearities in the relationship between census block income and 
mail eligibility.  They measure the share of voters from high- and moderate-income 
census blocks who are mail eligible (the omitted category is of voters from low-income 
census blocks who are mail eligible): 
                                                                                                                                                 
home counties and media markets to account for home-town candidate preferences that may cause 
differentials within precincts in Democratic vote shares across the two races.  
6 gp(.) is a function of voter-level variables because the determinants of the Democratic candidate's vote 
share can not be written as a function of precinct-level summaries of the elements of Ω; the vendor's 
targeting rule depended on interactions at the voter level between mail eligibility and census-block income.     
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g1p = share of voters who are from a census block with more than (5.08131 + s)  
    percent of residents with incomes above $150,000 AND are mail eligible 
 
and 
g2p = share of voters who are from a census block with percent of residents with 
incomes above $150,000 between (5.08131 - s) and (5.08131 + s) AND  
are mail eligible 
 
where s = 1, 2, or 3.   
For the reasons discussed above, simple OLS estimates of (1) are likely to be 
inconsistent:  mp explicitly depends on Ip and implicitly on εrpt (because of the unobserved 
phone survey).  We therefore write mp as a function of a constant term θ0, a vector 
function hp(.), and an error term ωp:  
p p p h m ω θ θ + Ω + = 2 0 ) (.  
To estimate (1) by instrumental variables, we impose the exclusion restriction that 
mail-eligible voters from census blocks with just more than the threshold share of 
households earning above $150,000 have the same propensity to vote for a Democratic 
candidate as mail-eligible voters from census blocks with just less than the threshold 
share of these households.  We implement this identification strategy with the following 
specification of h(.): 
h(Ω) = [g(Ω) | h1p] , 
where  
h1p = share of voters who are from a census block with percent of residents with 
incomes above $150,000 between 5.08131 and (5.08131 + s) AND are  
mail eligible 
 
The vector functions g(.) and h(.) are specified to make this exclusion restriction 
as weak as possible.  By including a cubic polynomial of Ip in g(.), we attempt to capture 
any possible direct effects of census-block income on voters' propensity to choose  
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Democratic candidates.  Interacting the cubic polynomial of Ip with Xp in g(.) allows the 
effects of the covariates, most importantly mail eligibility, to vary with the income-level 
of the precinct.  
  The inclusion of g1p and g2p in g(.) allows for the possibility that mail eligibility 
and census-block income interact to affect the probability of voting Democratic in some 
way that is not captured by the precinct-level interactions between Ip and Xp. By including 
g1p and g2p, identification is reduced to the condition that after controlling for Xp, the 
cubic polynomial of Ip, and the interaction of Xp and the cubic polynomial of Ip, the 
interactive effect between census-block income and mail eligibility does not change over 
the interval (5.08181 – s, 5.08181 + s).  The exclusion of h1p from g(.) only assumes that 
mail-eligible voters from census blocks with between 5.08131 and 5.08131 + s percent of 
households earning more than $150,000 have the same propensity to vote Democratic, 
conditional on observables, as voters from census blocks with between 5.08131 - s and 
5.08131 percent of high-income households.  We vary the size of the window s to 
investigate the sensitivity of our results to the scope of our exclusion restriction.  
 
Results 
Table 4 presents IV estimates of the effect of the proportion of registered voters 
receiving mail on Democratic vote shares for attorney general and the control race in 
2002 and 2006.  The table reports estimates of four parameters:  the effect of mail on the 
vote share in the control race in 2002, α1; the differential effect of mail on the attorney 
general race in 2002, β1; the differential effect of mail on the control race in 2006, δ1; and 
the differential effect of mail on the attorney general race in 2006, φ1.  The regressors  
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underlying the first three of these parameters are meant to capture heterogeneity in voter 
preferences correlated with a precinct receiving mail but not due to the causal effect of 
mail:  indeed, there can be no causal effect of the mail on the any of the 2002 elections, 
because the mail was not sent until four years later.  The parameter of interest in this 
model is φ1, which is the IV analogue of the DDD estimate from Table 2.  Standard errors 
allowing for arbitrary within-precinct correlation of the error term εrpt are in parentheses.   
  Table 4 shows that the IV estimate of the effect of mail is, if anything, larger than 
the DDD effect in Table 2.   Column (1) of the Table presents estimates from the IV 
model that is the closest analogue to Table 2 -- one that uses the governor's race as a 
control and uses a window of 3 percentage points around the income discontinuity (s = 
3).   In that specification, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of voters receiving 
mail leads to a 3.34 percentage point increase in difference in the share of votes for the 
Democratic candidate for attorney general versus the Democratic candidate for governor, 
in the 2006 versus the 2002 election (standard error 1.97 percentage points).  Substituting 
the secretary of state race for the gubernatorial race (column (2)) gives a similar estimate 
of 3.62 percentage points, but does lead to a slight decline in its standard error (standard 
error 1.58 percentage points).
7   
  Columns (3) - (6) of Table 4 present results from models that use a smaller 
window around the income discontinuity.  By using a smaller window, these models 
impose a weaker exclusion restriction; they reduce the income range of precincts that are 
assumed to be otherwise conditionally similar in their preference for the Democratic 
candidate for attorney general in 2006.  Shrinking the window used to identify the IV 
                                                 
7 The standard errors in the Secretary of State’s race are likely lower because the same two candidates race 
in both 2002 and 2006.   
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effect leads it to decline slightly in magnitude and statistical significance, but does not 
alter our basic result.  The smallest estimated effect of mail that we obtain, based on a 
model with a window size of s = 1 and the secretary of state as the control race (column 
(6)), still implies that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of voters receiving mail 
leads to a 2.49 percentage point increase in the differential vote share for candidate of 
interest (standard error 1.42). 
The fifth row of the table presents the p-value of the test of the hypothesis that the 
effect of mail on the level of the Democratic vote share for attorney general in 2006 
equals zero (i.e, h0: α1 + β1 + δ1 + φ1 = 0).  Each of the coefficients β1, δ1, φ1 represent an 
effect of mail on some difference in vote shares, either over time or across races; the sum 
of α1, β1, δ1, and φ1 represent the total effect of mail on the level of the Democratic vote 
share in the race of interest.  Except in models that use the smallest window around the 
income discontinuity, the effect of mail on the level of vote share is positive and 
statistically distinguishable from zero.   
 
6. Identifying the Mechanism for the Change in Vote Share 
In the previous section, we showed that a direct mail campaign that criticized the 
Republican incumbent attorney general increased voters' propensity to vote for the 
Democratic challenger for that office relative to their propensity to vote for the 
Democratic candidate for governor.  There could be two possible reasons for such a 
causal effect.  The first is that receiving the direct mail persuaded individuals who were 
already going to turnout to switch for whom they voted.  The second is that receiving the 
direct mail persuaded individuals who supported the Democratic attorney general  
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candidate to turnout to vote.  In this section, we investigate whether there is any evidence 
for the second possibility.   
Estimating the effect of mail on turnout is more straightforward than estimating 
the effect of mail on vote share because we observe at the individual level both whether 
an individual received mail and whether s/he turned out to vote.  Formally, for each 
registered voter j = 1, … , N in precinct p = (1, …, P) at year t = (2002, 2006) we specify 
turnout Tjpt, as a function of precinct-level fixed effects, λ0
P and π0
P; whether the voter 
received mail in the 2006 elections, mjp;  a vector function gjp(Ω) of the characteristics Ω 










ε π π π
λ λ λ
+ Ω + +
+ Ω + + =




     (2) 
In this model, the vector function gjp(.) is defined analogously to the function gp(.) in the 
precinct-level model, except that all elements are returned at the individual or census 
block level.  For the same reasons as in the precinct-level model of vote share, OLS 
estimates of the effect of mail on turnout are likely to be inconsistent.  We therefore write 
mjp as a function of precinct fixed-effects ρ0
P




o jp h m ω θ θ ρ + Ω + + = 1 0 ) ( 
Analogously to the case before, to estimate (2) by instrumental variables, we 
impose the exclusion restriction that mail-eligible voters from census blocks with just 
more than the threshold share of households earning above $150,000 have the same 
propensity to vote for a Democratic candidate as mail-eligible voters from census blocks  
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with just less than the threshold share.  We do this by defining the vector function h(.) 
analogously to the precinct-level model.    
Table 5 presents IV estimates of the effect of mail on turnout, λ1 and π1 from 
equation (2).  As in table 4, standard errors allowing for arbitrary within-precinct 
correlation of the residuals are in parentheses.  In contrast to the estimates in table 4, the 
effect of persuasive mail on turnout is neither statistically nor politically significant.  
Using the smallest possible window around the discontinuity (column (3)), the point 
estimate of the effect of mail on turnout in 2006, over and above the "control" or 
"placebo" effect of mail in 2002, π1, is 0.023, which implies that a 10 percent increase in 
the likelihood of receiving mail would have at most a 0.2 percent effect on turnout.  A 
turnout effect of this magnitude can not explain the finding in the previous section.  
There, a 10 percent increase in the proportion of registered voters receiving mail led to an 
increase in vote share of approximately 3 percentage points -- more than ten times as 
much.  Even assuming a turnout effect equal to the upper bound of the 95 percent 
confidence interval of the estimate from column (3) can explain only a very small portion 
of the effect of mail on vote share.   At least for the experiment we evaluate here, the 
effect of mail on voting appears to come through persuasion of individuals who were 
already going to turnout to switch for whom they voted. 
 
7. Conclusion 
  To explore the importance of campaign activity on political outcomes, we 
estimate the effect of a series of direct mailings on voter turnout and candidate choice in 
the 2006 Kansas attorney general race.  We find that mailings sent criticizing the  
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Republican incumbent had both a statistically and politically significant effect on his vote 
share.  Our estimates suggest that a ten percentage point increase in the amount of mail 
sent to a precinct increased the Democratic challenger’s vote share by about three 
percentage points.  Furthermore, we find no evidence that these mailings affected turnout.  
As a result, we conclude that these mailings persuaded individuals who were already 
going to turnout to switch for whom they voted.   
  These effects are quite large.  By comparison, in a meta-analysis of field 
experiments, Green and Gerber (2008) find that several pieces of direct mail increase 
turnout by about one percentage point.  There is only limited evidence on the persuasive 
effects of direct mail campaigns, but previous studies find much smaller effects than 
those reported in tables 2 and 4 (Gerber 2004). A number of factors might account for 
this difference.  First, these are estimates and one standard deviation is approximately 
40%-50% of the size of the measured effect. Although we reject the hypothesis that the 
true effect is zero, we can not reject the hypothesis that the true effect is materially lower 
than the point estimate.  Second, the particular race we study is a down-ballot race; it was 
not the primary race mobilizing voters to the polls.  Direct mail likely has a larger 
potential effect in such environment than in a presidential race where voters are much 
better informed about the issues.  Third, the local-average treatment effect we estimate 
only applies to so-called "mail eligible" voters -- namely, those who were predetermined 
by the vendor to be particularly susceptible to persuasion; mail almost surely would be 
less effective in the population at large.   
The magnitude of our estimate might also be evidence of spillover effects, or 
social interaction among voters.  Our treatment effects are estimated at the precinct level  
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and may reflect changes in households that were not send mail but live in a precinct 
where the mailings were concentrated. Even if such spillover effects are only half as large 
as direct effects, each treated household influences one other household through social 
interactions, and for simplicity the effects of such additional communications are linearly 
additive and confined to the precinct, then social interactions would account for one-third 
of the magnitude of the total effect.  Designing an experiment or formulating a structural 
model that could distinguish between direct and spillover effects of voter persuasion is an 
important area for future research. 
Although our study is of a single direct mail campaign, the method we propose 
for analyzing campaign communications is general and can be applied to other situations 
where there exist geographic discontinuities in targeting formulas.  Because this method 
can be applied retroactively, it may permit scholars to analyze elections that have already 
occurred.  RD is likely to be acceptable to a broader set of campaigns than randomized 
experimentation, which requires setting aside randomized control groups. RD analysis 
may therefore represent a complementary methodology to field experiments in learning 
how and when campaign activity affects citizens’ voting behavior.    
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Table 1 





Percentage of voters: 
  receiving mail in 2006  0.100  0.074 
  voting for Democratic Attorney General in 2006  0.533  0.093 
  voting for Democratic Governor in 2006  0.554  0.099 
  voting for Democratic Secretary of State in 2006  0.283  0.107 
    
  mail eligible   0.271  0.089 
  registered Democrat  0.256  0.088 
  registered Republican   0.516  0.124 
  female   0.534  0.031 
    
  voting for Democratic Attorney General in 2002  0.483  0.108 
  voting for Democratic Governor in 2002  0.532  0.105 
  voting for Democratic Secretary of State in 2002  0.282  0.101 
 
Number of voters (unweighted)  381.44  485.66
 
Note:  N = 1731 precincts.  Observations weighted by total votes in 2006 Attorney 
General Race. 
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Table 2 
Democratic Candidates' Vote Shares in 2006 and 2002 
Precincts Just Above versus Just Below the Income Threshold for Receiving Mail  
 
Vote Share for Dem AG  Vote Share for Dem Gov   
2006 2002 2006 2002 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Precincts Just Above Income Threshold for Receiving Mail in 2006  
Share of voters receiving mail = 0.168  (N = 77) 
0.550 0.469 0.546 0.510 
      
Precincts Just Below Income Threshold for Receiving Mail in 2006  
Share of voters receiving mail = 0.075 (N = 337) 
0.545 0.485 0.572 0.534 
















Difference-in-difference-in difference effect of mail:  difference in Democratic vote shares, 
precincts just above versus just below income threshold for mail, race for attorney general 





Notes:  "Precincts just above income threshold for receiving mail" are those that have at least 10 percent of voters mail eligible AND 
from census blocks with 5.08131-8.08131 percent of households earning more than $150,000.  "Precincts just below income threshold 
for receiving mail" are those that have at least 10 percent of voters mail eligible AND from census blocks with 2.08131-5.08131 
percent of households earning more than $150,000.  
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Table 3:  Other characteristics of Precincts Just Above and Just Below Income Threshold  




Precincts Just Above 
Income Threshold 
for Receiving Mail 
Precincts Just Below 
Income Threshold 
for Receiving Mail 
 
Percentage of registered voters: 
 
  earning more than $150,000  0.049 0.028 
 
  mail eligible  0.252  0.293 
  registered Democrat  0.238  0.268 
  registered Republican  0.534  0.491 
  Female  0.525  0.537 
  
  voting for Democratic Sec'y of State in 2002  0.265  0.296 
  voting for Democratic Sec'y of State in 2006  0.268  0.309 
    
# Precincts  77  337 
 
 
Notes: "Precincts just above income threshold for receiving mail" are those that have at 
least 10 percent of voters mail eligible AND from census blocks with 5.08131-8.08131 
percent of households earning more than $150,000.  "Precincts just below income 
threshold for receiving mail" are those that have at least 10 percent of voters mail eligible 
AND from census blocks with 2.08131-5.08131 percent of households earning more than 
$150,000. 
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Table 4:  IV Effect of Mail On Vote Share  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
% registered voters receiving mail in 2006 (α1)      0.347 0.352 0.214 0.218 0.076 0.185 
    (0.221) (0.148) (0.168) (0.103) (0.179) (0.101) 
        
0.006 0.001 0.013 0.010 0.069 -0.039  % registered voters receiving mail in 
2006*attorney general (β1)    (0.151) (0.192) (0.115) (0.151) (0.114) (0.141) 
        














        
% registered voters receiving mail in 2006* 













        
p-value testing effect of mail on 2006 level of 
vote share for attorney general = 0: 
h0: α1 + β1 + δ1 + φ1 =  0  0.020 0.019 0.040 0.040 0.256 0.256 
        
Control race  Governor  Sec'y state  Governor  Sec'y state Governor Sec'y  state 
 
Size of window around discontinuity  3 (large)  3 (large)  2 (med)  2 (med)  1 (small)  1 (small) 
 
R-squared  0.490 0.811 0.522 0.824 0.542 0.829 
 
Notes:  N = 6924 = 1731 precincts * 2 races * 2 time periods.  Observations weighted by total votes in each respective race.  Standard 
errors calculated allowing for clustering at the precinct level. 
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Table 5:  IV Effect of Mail On Turnout  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
Received mail in 2006? (1 = yes) (λ1)  -0.035 -0.022 -0.029 
   (0.026) (0.025) (0.033) 
     
Received mail in 2006 * year=2006 (π1)  0.018 0.011 0.023 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.022) 
     
p-value testing effect of mail on 2006 level of turnout = 0 
h0: λ1 + π1 = 0  0.497 0.616 0.831 
     
Size of window around discontinuity  3 (large)  2 (medium)  1 (small) 
     
R-squared  0.120 0.120 0.120 
 
Notes:  N = 564980 individuals.  Standard errors calculated allowing for clustering at the precinct level (1731 precincts) 
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